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AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION TO
ASSIST IN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ARISES FROM
THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES
OF STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
In August, 1981, in Nairobi, Kenya, delegates from 125 countries
attended the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy (UNERG).' This Conference was a measure of
the interest of the world community in assisting developing coun-
tries to develop their energy potential. There was broad-based sup-
port, including the countries of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), for taking concrete steps
toward creating, implementing and funding an effective program
for developing new and renewable energy sources on a global scale.2
However, the United States sent its delegates to UNERG with
instructions not to support any new institutions or financing for
development of new and renewable energy sources in lesser
developed countries.3
The Conference accepted a broad Programme of Action that had
been drafted by the planning committee and the expert technical
committee formed in 1978 at the direction of the United Nations
(U.N.) General Assembly.'
Most of the discussions at the Conference centered on three basic
proposals for implementing the Programme of Action: one
presented by the Conference Secretariat,' another by the "Group
' U.N. Division for Economic and Social Information, Round-up of the U.N. Conference
on New and Renewable Sources of Energy (Nairobi, 10-21 Aug. 1981) (mimeographed materials)
[hereinafter cited as Conference Round-up]. This was the first time in two decades that
the representatives from oil-producing, industrialized and developing countries met to discuss
energy matters. Norman, U.N. Grapples with Renewable Energy, 213 Sci. 418 (1981).
' The Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 13, 1981 at 1, col. 1. If there actually had been a vote
to finance a program to help developing countries with new and renewable energy sources
through a World Bank affiliate, it is estimated that the vote would have been 124 to 1,
with the United States dissenting. Telephone interview with David Chatfield, editor of
Renews, the daily publication at UNERG (Feb. 8, 1982).
' The Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 11, 1981 at 24, col. 1. See also Norman, U.S. Derails
Energy Plan for Third World, 212 Sci. 21 (1981), which offers a concise background of the
United States position on financing foreign energy development.
G.A. Res. 33/148 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.N.Y.B. 572. The Programme of Action calls
for implementation in five broad policy areas: energy *assessment and planning; informa-
tion flows; research, development and demonstration; transfer, adaptation and application
of mature technologies; and education and training. Conference Round-Up, supra note 1, at 14.
' The Conference Secretariat proposed designating an "appropriate intergovernmental
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of 77,6 and a third by the United States.7
As early as February, 1981, the United States stated publicly
that it could "neither support the creation of nor participate
in ... " a World Bank affiliate concerned with energy issues such
as that proposed by former World Bank President, Robert
McNamara.' This attitude prevented meaningful compromise discus-
sions, due to the widespread belief that a World Bank affiliate would
not work without United States participation.'
The Conference concluded, leaving responsibility for the im-
plementation of the Programme of Action to a committee that met
in 1982. The committee report, passed by the General Assembly
at its 1982 session, calls for the creation of an intergovernmental
Committee on the Development and Utilization of New and Renew-
able Sources of Energy to coordinate the implementation of the
Programme of Action."0
This Note explores the question of whether international law
imposes a duty upon the United States to assist less developed
countries in finding and developing new and renewable energy
sources. It is asserted that this duty arises from article 55(a) of
the U.N. Charter, which calls for the promotion of higher social
and economic progress and development." This duty also arises
body" and a Secretariat unit within the United Nations for "the implementation and monitor-
ing" of the Programme of Action. Id. at 12. They made no proposals for financing because
during most of the preparations it had been expected that a World Bank affiliate, as pro-
posed by Robert McNamara in August of 1980, would be created. See Norman, supra note
1, at 419. For the McNamara proposal see WORLD BANK, ENERGY IN THE DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES (Aug. 1980).
, The "Group of 77," representing the developing nations, wanted an intergovernmental
committee specifically concerned with new and renewable energy sources and open to all
states within the United Nations system to guide and monitor implementation of the Pro-
gramme of Action. Conference-Round-Up, supra note 1, at 12. They sought the World Bank
as a major source of "additional and adequate resources" to fund the Programme. This
money would come primarily from the industrialized countries. Id. at 13.
7 The United States proposed designating the already-existing Committee on Natural
Resources of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) as the in-
tergovernmental body "to monitor and facilitate co-operation in implementing the Pro-
gramme." Id. at 12. Funding would be within each country's discretion, and the use of
private investment capital would be emphasized. Id. at 13.
Norman, supra note 3, at 21.
See Fatoyinbo, Q A on Energy and The World Bank, 1 THE BANK'S WORLD 10, 11-12 (1982).
Ernest Stern, Senior Vice-President of The World Bank, cited three obstacles to a suc-
cessful energy affiliate without United States support: first, money markets would con-
sider United States participation a major element in the decision to lend money to the
World Bank; second, few countries would be willing to pay what would have been the United
States share; and third, the general belief that everyone must participate in activities that
are of interest to the entire international community. Id.
10 See AfRes/37/250 in U.N. Press Release, GA/6787, 4 Jan., 1983.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55(a).
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from the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which
seeks to encourage increased development assistance.2
The industrialized nations have never considered U.N. resolu-
tions as sources of international legal obligation. The world is chang-
ing, however, and a more flexible legal framework that recognizes
modified definitions of the sources of international legal obliga-
tion is required.' 3
This Note examines as well the expanding role of the United
Nations in developing international law. It explores the concepts
of consensus agreement among U.N. Member States, evidence of
practice of states, General Assembly resolutions as interpretations
of the U.N. Charter, and implicit acceptance of resolutions through
implementation, in arriving at the conclusion that U.N. resolutions
and more specifically the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States should in certain circumstances be regarded as codifica-
tions of international law.
II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law has been defined as, a "body of rules and prin-
ciples of action which are binding upon civilized states in their
relations with one another."'4 The four primary sources of inter-
national law are found in article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (I.C.J.).5 They are: (1) international conven-
tions; (2) international custom as evidence of practice of states;
(3) general principles of law; and (4) in some cases, judicial deci-
sions and teachings of publicists.'"
The principles enunciated in article 38 emerged in Europe with
the formation of states ruled by sovereign monarchs. 7 The law
among these states increasingly emphasized voluntary law
1 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975),
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 289 (1980). Ap-
plicable parts of the resolution include arts. 10, 17, 22, and 25 [hereinafter cited as G.A.
Res. 3281].
13 See generally W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964).
14 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (1963).
"5 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993, 1 U.N.T.S. 9, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER
23 (1980) [hereinafter cited as I.C.J. STAT.]. The provisions of article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice are "generally regarded as a complete statement of the
sources of international law." I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(1979).
1" I.C.J. STAT. art. 38; I.CJ. STAT. art. 59, which provides that decisions of the court have
"no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case," must
be read coextensively with article 38.
" For a detailed discussion of the origins of international law, see C. HENKIN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1-9 (1980); J. BRIERLY, supra note 14, at 1-40.
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developed through state practice and custom as distinguished from
the earlier philosophy of natural law derived from universal
reason. 8 Later, the concept of sovereignty was articulated, em-
bodying principles of equity and mutual respect among sovereigns
and the requirement of consent in order to be bound. 9
International codification of customary law by multinational
gatherings has occurred since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
These gatherings first were institutionalized in the ill-fated League
of Nations.10 Its demise, followed by World War II, accentuated
the need for a new institution that would bring greater stability
to the world. This new institution became the United Nations.
III. RECENT EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
With the increase in communication among countries after World
War I, international law gradually evolved to accommodate the
power shifts in Europe and the need to cooperate rather than
simply coexist." Part of this change was manifested in the increased
use of diplomacy, negotiation and conferences.' Despite these ad-
vances, the basic principles of international law remained unchanged
until the end of World War II, as developed nations continued to
dominate international forums. After World War II, all nations of
the world were included in the United Nations rather than just
the developed nations.
Following the establishment of the United Nations, international
law entered a sharply accelerated transition period, which continues
to the present. The number of countries that belong to the United
Nations has grown from the original 51 signatories to over 150.
Most of these are newly independent countries that had never con-
tributed substantially to the formulation of customs used in "tradi-
tional" international law. They had little experience in negotiating
treaties and other express agreements.23 Nonetheless, the United
18 C. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 5.
" See generally J. BRIERLY, supra note 14, at 7-16.
See I. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES 22-34, 41-54 (4th ed. 1971). Unfortunately the
League was short-lived, being unable to overcome several flaws in its creation. In a pure
sense, the League was not truly international because all potential members were not ac-
cepted for membership. Also, it was hampered by the requirement of unanimity. In those
days, "the first principle of every Conference was that of unanimity." Id. at 119 (quoting
L. WOOLF, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 109 (1916)).
2 C. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 9.
See I. CLAUDE, supra note 20, at 24-31, for a discussion on the Concert of Europe and
the Hague Conventions that detail this evolution.
I Their ideas on the conduct of international relations vary and are often inconsistent




Nations Charter recognizes, in article 2(1), the principle that each
Member State is the "sovereign equal" of all other Member States.'
It extends to each state the right to participate in international
forums as an equal to all others.25
Shifts in economic power also have marked this period. With
increased consumption of fossil fuels by the United States, the Euro-
pean countries and Japan, there has been an enormous shift of
financial power to the oil-exporting states of the Middle East. 6
The European nations once controlled these resources through
their power over their colonies. Although most of the former col-
onial powers retain some investment power over these resources,
European and United States control has declined considerably
because of the many nationalizations' and increased host-country
participation in processing.
Because of the markedly changed composition of the commun-
ity of nations and the alterations in relative economic power that
have taken place in the last forty years, modification of present
international legal norm-creation is necessary. It is logical that
the United Nations, with its universal membership, should have
an expanded role as a source of international law.28
IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Many observers note that the General Assembly cannot create
binding law except in very limited spheres.29 This view holds that
2 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
Presumably, all are now considered "civilized nations" as article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute
requires. See also J. BRIERLY, sup'a note 14, at 1.
" At the end of the World War II the United States was the preeminent economic power.
The economies of many countries were destroyed by the war and much of the world was
totally dependent upon a colonizing power. The United States dollar became the basis for
the international monetary and trading systems set up at the United Nations Monetary
and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. 3 C. BEVINS, TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 1351, 1390 (1969). It was United States money that
helped to rebuild Europe. Since then, both the European and Japanese economies have
flourished. See M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 33 (2d ed. 1976); R. MEAGHER, AN IN-
TERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER 20 (1979).
' See U.S. Dep't of State Report on Nationalization, Expropriation, and Other Takings
of U.S. and Certain Foreign Property Since 1960, reprinted in 11 LL.M. 84-118.
" The widespread presence of multinational corporations (MNC) also argues for an ex-
panded role for the United Nations. MNC's are "beyond the traditional bounds of
sovereignty." Since no single country can exercise effective control over them, the United
Nations is the most appropriate institution to regulate their nongovernmental transna-
tional activities. See Ferguson, Redressing Global Injustices: The Role of Law, 33 RUT. L.
REV. 412, 417-18 (1981).
" I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 14-15, 696; BRIERLY, supra note 14, at 110. The Charter
does give the General Assembly the power to create binding law on internal procedural
matters and the budget. U.N. CHARTER arts. 17, 18.
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the function of the United Nations, as described in article 13 of
the United Nations Charter, is to "initiate studies and make
recommendations."3 According to this contention, resolutions and
declarations of the General Assembly have no binding legal effect.3
The United Nations Charter was drafted while World War II
was raging. Its major emphasis, understandably, was the main-
tenance of peace and security.2 Of necessity, it focused the
grant of law-making powers on these aspects of international rela-
tions, and it placed those powers in the hands of the Security
Council.3 However, the United Nations Charter does not exclude
the General Assembly from consideration of these issues. 4
Often overlooked is the fact that the United Nations was not
created to deal exclusively with matters of peace and security.
It was designed to consider a comprehensive range of subjects, 5
among them the achievement of international cooperation in solv-
ing international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character." Article 13 of the United Nations Charter
gives the mandate for promoting these activities to the General
Assembly. 7 The Security Council, on the other hand, is given no
specific role in fostering international economic and social coopera-
tion. Its main responsibilities stem from the provisions for main-
taining peace and security, some of which have fallen into disuse.3"
The need for cooperative efforts toward solving social and economic
problems has become more pronounced. This has caused a shift
in the emphasis of United Nations activity from the Security Council
to the General Assembly and the principal organs responsible to
it. Today the United Nations deals increasingly with social,
economic and humanitarian matters. 9
United Nations members willingly have allowed, and even en-
I U.N. CHARTER art. 13.
31 I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 14-15.
32 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
" Id. arts. 39-42.
" Id. arts. 10-15. It is clear that the General Assembly was to "consider the general
principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security .. . and
make recommendations ... to members or to the Security Council or both." Id. art. 11,
para. 1.
31 I. CLAUDE, supra note 20, at 67.
N U.N. CHARTER arts. 13, 55.
" Id. art. 13, paras. 1(b), 2.
' Id. arts. 4347. These articles provide for the creation and maintenance of United Nations
general forces with a central command. These forces have never come into existence.
It is noteworthy that the United Nations has ignored the recent Iraq-Iran war and
the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, but is working actively on the law of the sea, energy
problems and human rights issues.
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couraged, a shift of responsibility for maintaining peace and security
from the Security Council to the General Assembly.0 Under ar-
ticles 10 through 15, the General Assembly can discuss any ques-
tions or matters within the scope of the Charter and make recom-
mendations thereon unless the Security Council is exercising its
authority over any dispute or any other function assigned to it."'
Prior to 1950, the usual procedure for transferring a matter from
the Security Council to the General Assembly was for the Secur-
ity Council to remove the matter from its agenda.42 With passage
of the Uniting for Peace Resolution," the General Assembly "as-
sumed the power to reverse the Security Council"" when that body
could not act because of the veto power exercised by a permanent
member. Most of that resolution was within the authority of the
Assembly; but as one authority points out, the sponsors of the
resolution intended, and subsequent practice has confirmed, the
right of the Assembly to recommend enforcement measures, a right
previously held only by the Security Council.45
The ability of one body to act in the capacity of another does
not imbue the first with all the powers of the second. Further-
more, this shift of responsibility was for peace and security mat-
ters that are concededly of much graver concern than issues of
social and economic development. Nonetheless, the foundation was
laid by the members of the United Nations for an increasing law-
making role for the General Assembly.46
40 For example, in 1947 the Assembly took over the Greek question from the Security
Council, which had taken the question off of its agenda and instructed that all records
and documents of the case be put at the disposal of the General Assembly. S. BAILEY,
THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 367 (1975).
41 U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-15. The restriction alluded to appears in art. 12(1).
41 Id. art. 12; S. BAILEY, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 17 (1964). See
also supra note 40.
:3 G.A. Res. 337A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951).
" I. CLAUDE, supra note 20, at 177.
, S. BAILEY, supra note 40, at 230.
40 Many countries at one time or another have used the General Assembly to achieve
ends not otherwise possible. It is ironic that the United States, which now proclaims the
ineffectiveness of the General Assembly, was the first to imbue it with law-making powers
in the Uniting For Peace Resolution. The Soviets are more reluctant to recognize the powers
of any international organization, preferring to view the United Nations as a contractual
arrangement. Wesson, The United Nations in the World Outlook of the Soviet Union and
of the United States in SOVIET AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS 32 (Rubinstein
& Ginsburgs eds. 1971). They have, however, used the General Assembly to win the sup-
port of lesser developed countries. Id. at 29-31. The "Group of 77," the developing nations,
has made the most consistent use of the General Assembly. They have no represent-
ative as a permanent member of the Security Council, and the General Assembly is the
only forum in which they can express themselves effectively. Major successes within the
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Several writers acknowledge the "quasi-legislative competence"
of the General Assembly.47 At the center of this argument is the
idea that the General Assembly produces norms that may func-
tion as law although not formally binding.4" For example, draft rules
sometimes are given the same weight as treaties in support of
a court's result.4 9 Professor Friedmann also uses the term "quasi-
legislative" in noting that resolutions of the General Assembly
"clearly have considerable impact on the development of the law."'
There is another functional, albeit indirect, way in which the
General Assembly can assist in the creation of law. If a resolution
is rejected repeatedly, the participants will be encouraged to modify
their positions until agreement can be reached."1 All actions bear-
ing on a final vote can be seen therefore as law-creating.
International legislation has not been considered a traditional
source of international law.5" Clearly, however, the creation of in-
ternational law was a role intended for the General Assembly when
the United Nations Charter was written. Article 13 of the Charter
calls on the General Assembly to study and recommend "for the
purpose of... encouraging the progressive development of inter-
national law and its codification." ' The General Assembly im-
plemented this provision with the establishment of the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) in 1948.5
General Assembly have been the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and the development of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States, with subsequent efforts to implement it. See generally I. CLAUDE, supra note 20,
at 12740.
" Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
782 (1966). He defines quasi-legislative competence as a "middle position between a for-
mally difficult affirmation of true legislative status and a formalistic denial of law-creating
role and impact." Id. This approach also makes it possible to view each General Assembly
action separately and to decide whether it specifically has the force of a legislative pro-
nouncement. See also W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 13, at 135-41.
48 See Falk, supra note 47, at 783-84, for examples of unratified treaties and draft treaties
being used as though they were binding on other parties.
49 Id.
-1 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 13, at 138. The example he gives is the Resolution on Perma-
nent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 259 (West 1980).
5' C. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 97.
It is not included in the "sources" of article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute. See supra notes
15, 16 and accompanying text.
1 U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1(a).
5 W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 13, at 135-37. Friedmann points out that the ILC performs
two main functions. It prepares definite draft conventions for approval by international
law-making bodies, and discusses theories and reformulations of parts of international law
not yet ready for codification. Id. at 136.
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It is logical to look upon the General Assembly as having some
legislative competence for other reasons as well. It is the center
of the administrative system of the United Nations, with budgetary
and supervisory powers over the other internal organs. It has broad
powers to make recommendations to the Security Council or to
members of the United Nations under article 1 0 .1 The unique posi-
tion of the General Assembly has tended to make it the "unrivaled
principal organ of the entire system.""
Consent, with its corollary of unanimity, is no longer viable as
a requirement for binding international legal obligation. 7 Such a
theory was possible of practical application only when the inter-
national community was smaller and more homogeneous. Now, in
order for international security to function effectively, "it requires
a limited legislative authority, at minimum, to translate an over-
riding consensus into rules of order and norms of obligation despite
the opposition of one or more sovereign states.."58 The United Na-
tions Charter already provides for nonconsensual binding law. Ar-
ticles 39 through 42 allow the Security Council to make decisions
binding on all Members without their consent. 9
The United Nations Charter also rejects the requirement of
unanimity by creating rules for simple or extraordinary majorities
in all organs of the system.' One remnant of unanimity is the veto
power of the permanent members of the Security Council. 1 It is
attenuated, however, by the fact that on votes in which a perma-
nent member abstains, a proposal may pass without unanimity.2
Majority votes can be binding within the General Assembly, but
the current dilemma centers upon which questions may be so
decided.' Countries that vote with the majority are inclined to
view the action undertaken by that vote as binding; those in the
5 U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
I. CLAUDE, supra note 20, at 181.
5' For a theory that the basis of international legal obligation lies in the consensual will
of the world community, see C. JENKS, LAW, FREEDOM AND WELFARE 83-100 (1963).
' Falk, supra note 47, at 785.
51 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42.
" Id. arts. 18, 27, 67, 89. In contrast, The Covenant of the League of Nations expressly
incorporated the requirement of unanimity for decisions on all substantive issues. LEAGUE
OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 5, reprinted in I. CLAUDE, supra note 20, at 453, 455.
" U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. Actually this is modified unanimity, as resolutions pass
with nine affirmative votes including the five major powers. In fact the major powers need
not give an affirmative vote; an abstention by one or all of the permanent members still
could result in passage as long as nine members voted affirmatively.
62 Id.
Majority votes on appropriations and budgetary matters clearly are binding on all
members. U.N. CHARTER arts. 17. 18.
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minority deny that they are so bound. 4 Although majority rule
is uncomfortable for some, the unattainability of unanimity dic-
tates that consensus increasingly be applied. 5
Whether the majority has reached a consensus will depend upon
its size and composition. In Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libyan
Arab Republic,"s Professor Dupuy, the arbitrator, concluded that
an act "assented to by a great many states representing not only
all geographic areas but also all economic systems" is necessary
for a legally binding consensus. 7 Translating this into concrete
terms, a declaration or resolution of the General Assembly agreed
to by many developed countries and Soviet bloc countries, as well
as by most developing countries, would have the necessary con-
sensus to be effective legally. s8 There is some difference of opin-
ion on this point. Professor Sohn recognizes consensus agreement
as an effective and distinct alternative to an "old fashioned trea-
ty" requiring ratification, but cautions that "all the important
members of the international community" must accept it as
binding. 9 This implies that if one of the "superpowers" does not
accept, there is no consensus.
Professor Falk seems to adopt a sliding scale approach to con-
sensus. The closer an agreement comes to unanimity, especially
if it enjoys the backing of both the United States and the Soviet
Union, the stronger the consensus. The greater the dissidence or
lack of participation, the weaker the consensus. Given the need
" This fear of "the tyranny of the majority," is at the root of the current attempts to
deny the General Assembly powers conceded to it three decades ago when the composi-
tion of the General Assembly was very different. R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 7.
Previously the developed countries formed the majority, rather than a heavily outnumbered
minority. It has been pointed out that majority rule only works when both the majority
and the minority trust one another not to abuse or ignore the other's interests. I. CLAUDE,
supra note 20, at 125.
5 It is encouraging to note that the United States attitude may be changing. President
Carter's Report on the Reform and Restructuring of the United Nations System concluded
that "U.S. efforts might be better directed toward wider use of the consensus procedure"
in the General Assembly. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONG. RES. SERV., REFORM OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AND THEIR COMPARISON WITH PROPOSALS
OF OTHER COUNTRIES 75 U.S. Gov't Printing Off. Y4 F 76/2 UN 35/39 (1979).
17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
67 Id. at 28.
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, is an example of a consensus agreement generally considered
binding. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971),
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 75 (1980).
' Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 347, 352-53 (1981).
70 Falk, supra note 47, at 786-90.
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to reconcile majority rule with effective consensus, the formula
expressed by Professor Dupuy should prove workable.
The nature of the General Assembly's law-making capacity also
can be discerned from articles of the United Nations Charter. Many
scholars focus on articles 11 and 13, which purport to describe both
the process through which international law can be created and
the role of the General Assembly in such a process." Article 11
provides that "the General Assembly may consider the general prin-
ciples of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and
security ... ."2 Article 13 states that "the General Assembly shall
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of (a)
promoting international co-operation in the political field and en-
couraging the progressive development of international law and
its codification," and "(b) promoting international co-operation in
the economic [and] social .. . fields . . . ."I' One authority states
that article 13 gives the General Assembly the function of fulfill-
ing a mission rather than of exercising a power." It was under
the auspices of article 13, therefore, that the International Law
Commission was created. 5 On the other hand, Dr. Bokor-Szeg6 reads
article 13(1)(a) as a whole, and finds that the framers of the United
Nations Charter intended to make codification an explicit function
of the General Assembly."0
A different and more widely accepted reading of article 13 focuses
on "recommendations" as only evidence of customary law and the
general practice of states." The General Assembly is an interna-
l' H. BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION (1978);
P. BRUGIERE, LES POUVOIRS DE L'ASSEMBLkE GENERALE DES NATIONS UNIS EN MATIERE POLI-
TIQUE ET DE SECURITE 32 (1955) cited in H. BOKOR-SZEG0 at 26.
"2 U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 1 (emphasis added).
" Id. art. 13, paras. 1(a), (b) (emphasis added).
" Authors translation, P. BRUGIERE, supra note 71, at 26. Article 13 extends article 11
provisions, as article 11 provisions do not mention social and economic matters.
"' In other words, the United Nations General Assembly was empowered to create an
institution with the authority to develop and codify international law progressively. See
supra note 54.
," Dr. Bokor-Szeg6 assumes this intention, being convinced that the creation of definite
legal regulation of the interstate relations was needed to develop international coopera-
tion in the political field. H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note 71, at 33.
Dr. Higgins writes:
Resolutions of the General Assembly are not per se binding: though those rules
of general international law which they may embody are binding on member states,
with or without the help of the resolution. But the body of resolutions as a whole,
taken as indications of a general customary law, undoubtedly provide a rich source
of evidence.
R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 5 (1963).
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tional body that meets on a regular basis. The Assembly serves
as a focal point for state practice as it is manifest in diplomatic
actions, public pronouncements and voting."8 The actions and prac-
tices of the organization likewise must be considered as evidence
of customary law in as much as they form part of the relationship
of the states to the organization.'
As more states accept a particular practice, as illustrated by
their vote on a resolution, the greater will be the moral force attrib-
utable to that resolution."s All signatories of the United Nations
Charter have a duty to make good faith efforts toward compliance
with resolutions passed by the General Assembly. 2 Resolutions
of the General Assembly are not treaties." Instead, it has been
recognized that the General Assembly has been instrumental in
promoting diplomatic conferences that often culminate in law-
making by treaty."
An additional way to characterize resolutions of the General
Assembly as having legal effect is to recognize the United Nations
,' Id. at 2.
I ld. Because the General Assembly and the committees and organs responsible to it
meet regularly, the number of occasions for collective action have increased greatly. As
much as individual acts can contribute to the development of customary law, "[clollective
acts of states, repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers with sufficient fre-
quency, eventually attain the status of law." Id.
80 C. PARRY, supra note 23, at 25.
81 R. HIGGINS, supra note 77, at 7.
82 As Judge Lauterpacht wrote:
Whatever may be the content of the recommendation and whatever may be
the nature and circumstances of the majority by which it has been reached, it
is nevertheless a legal act of the principal organ of the United Nations which
Members of the United Nations are under a duty to treat with a degree of respect
appropriate to a Resolution of the General Assembly.
South-West Africa Cases, 1955 I.C.J. 120 (Advisory Opinion of June 7) (Lauterpacht, J.,
separate opinion). Professor Sohn expresses the same idea a bit differently: "A Member
of the United Nations would not be fulfilling in good faith its obligations under the Charter,
if it were simply to ignore such recommendations without adducing any plausible reasons
for not giving effect to them." Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 23 (1978).
'a See J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 150 (1969). See also
C. PARRY, supra note 23, at 28-55 for a critical look at the use of treaties as a source of inter-
national law in view of the existence of international organizations.
[11n assessing its [the United Nations] proceedings as a source of international
law there is no need to attempt to force the whole operation into the shape of
a function of a treaty, or even to ponder particularly upon the 'binding force'
of resolutions of the General Assembly .... All falls very adequately into place
as part of the practice of States.
C. PARRY, supra note 23, at 113.
' The U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties resulted in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 59 (1980).
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Charter as a constitution. Many resolutions can be regarded thereby
as interpretations of the Charter.' Article 103 of the United Nations
Charter suggests that the Charter is a constitution, as the obliga-
tions of Members under the United Nations Charter prevail over
conflicting obligations.86 Interpretive resolutions and declarations
may not be binding immediately, but may require the passage of
time before becoming accepted as binding international law. 7
The role of the United Nations in creating international law is
expanding. Since the early years of its existence, Member States
have shown their willingness to conform the organization to their
needs." The tendency to accept consensus agreements," to impute
limited legislative competence to General Assembly action,0 and
to view General Assembly resolutions as interpretations of the
United Nations Charter91 are manifestations of this expansion.
V. LEGALLY BINDING EFFECT OF THE CHARTER OF
ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was passed
by the General Assembly in December, 1974.92 This Charter pro-
poses to establish a "New International Economic Order," in which
the economic resources of the world will be shared more equally
by all nations. 3
I Professor Sohn states, "[tihe practice of states in the last thirty-five years has given
the [UN] Charter and documents implementing it a status equivalent to that of constitu-
tional law in the domestic legal order." Sohn, supra note 69, at 355. See supra note 68
and accompanying text in which the Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States is viewed as an interpretation
of article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
" See also article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84,
in which a party cannot invoke internal law to justify its failure to observe international
law. These interpretive resolutions allow new international law to be created in a shorter
time span than was traditionally the case when new principles were being enunciated. Sohn,
supra note 82, at 17.
87 Sohn, supra note 82, at 22. See also Bollecker-Stern, The Legal Character of Emerging
NorX Relating to the New International Economic Order in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 70 (K. Hossain ed. 1980); Castaneda, La Charte des Droits
et Devoirs Economiques des Ektats in [1974] ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 31,
35-36.
" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 66-68.
" See supra note 47.
," See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
' G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12.
The proposed "new order" is embodied in two resolutions: The Declaration of the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI),
6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9553 (1974), reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 273 (1980); and the Programme of Ac-
tion on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res.
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The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was not
considered by all states to be a statement of law." However, there
are four grounds supporting the legally binding effect of the obliga-
tions it imposes upon Member States. First, the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States is evidence of the practice
of states prerequisite to creation of customary international law.
Second, it was accepted by consensus agreement as defined by
Professor Dupuy." Third, it can be viewed as an interpretation
of the United Nations Charter. Fourth, it has been accepted through
its implementation in several non-energy and energy-related areas.
A. Evidence of Practice of States
The practice of states in assisting developing countries and in
the repeated resolutions that preceded the acceptance of the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is evidence of
customary international law.
Custom, as Professor Oppenheim defines it, "[is] a clear and con-
tinuous habit of doing certain actions [that] has grown up under
the aegis of the conviction that these actions are according to Inter-
national Law, obligatory or right.""M In order for a given state prac-
tice to contribute to the creation of custom it must be undertaken
with the state's knowledge that the act is obligatory. However, this
definition ignores the possibility that at some point state practice
initially taken without a feeling of obligation evolves through con-
tinued practice and acceptability into an obligation. As Judge Lachs
pointed out, "to postulate that all states, even those which initiate
a given practice, believe themselves to be acting under a legal
obligation is to resort to a fiction. . . ."" It seems more logical
to recognize that states act for varied reasons, but that when they
act consistently and repeatedly on a particular issue, over a period
of time, an obligation arises to continue that behavior. Professor
3202 (S-VI), 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 276 (1980).
" The original draft language before the Second Committee (the Standing Committee
on Economic and Social Matters) read: "a fundamental purpose of this charter [is] to codify
and develop rules for the establishment of the new international economic order .... " R.
MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 45 (quoting A/9946 1974 at 3). Twelve developed countries wanted
the italicized words excluded because they would give the document the appearance of
being legally binding. The words eventually were replaced by "to promote." Id. at 45-46.
5 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
' North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 231 (Judgment of Feb. 20) (Lachs, J.,
dissenting). Surely those states that initiated slave-trading and allowed the institution of
slavery in their states did not consider themselves obligated to take such action.
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Schachter argues that the concepts of "international entitlement
to aid and preferences [to aid] based on need" have been accepted
by the industrialized countries. 8 He finds acceptance through their
concurrence with these concepts in international resolutions and
in the numerous assistance grants they have made to developing
nations.99
The practice of providing economic assistance to developing coun-
tries as prescribed by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States began even before the decolonization period of the 1950's
and 1960's.'00 In laying the groundwork for the United Nations
Charter, both the United States and the United Kingdom expressed
willingness to encourage cooperation among nations to achieve im-
proved social and economic standards.'0 ' After World War II, the
major colonial powers began to give financial aid to their colonies
for economic development." 2 As former colonies became indepen-
dent states, the United States and the Soviet Union began com-
petitive aid programs to capture the allegiance of these new
nations. °10 Aid programs now exist worldwide with virtually every
country either a donor or recipient."
The Latin American countries were the first to recognize the
importance of utilizing an appropriate framework for economic and
social development if assistance were to be successful.'05 Their ef-
forts were instrumental in the eventual drafting of the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States.106
The first major General Assembly resolution on economic
development was in 1962. It called for the convening of a special
conference on trade and development, which became the United
98 Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 9 (1976).
" Id. at 9-10.
10 R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 20-21.
.01 Id. at 16, (quoting R. ASHER, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL
WELFARE 178 (1957)). The manifestation of their concern was the creation of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a full year before the United Nations Charter
Conference was held. Id. at 16-17.
... Id. at 21.
103 Id.
104 For a discussion of the economic assistance programs of various donors that provides
perspectives on aid strategies, successes and failures, see L. BLACK, THE STRATEGY OF
FOREIGN AID (1968).
105 The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), under the leader-
ship of Raul Prebisch, drafted the first framework in which the nature of international
economic relations could be analyzed. R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 21-24. The 1950 report
of ECLA specifically recognized that "planning and setting priorities for the use of scarce
resources is an essential aspect of the development process." Id. at 23.
I" Id. at 21-24, 30-36.
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Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). °7 The
first session (UNCTAD I) met for over three months in 1964. As
a result of this conference, UNCTAD was established as a perma-
nent institution of the United Nations directly responsible to the
General Assembly. ° The principles of revised trade and economic
policy favoring the developing countries that were adopted at
UNCTAD I were not unanimously accepted.0 9 Nevertheless, they
did have an impact by encouraging the addition of Part IV to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which placed
a high priority on assisting developing countries with trade pro-
motion and development. 0
In 1968, UNCTAD II met to negotiate the implementation of
the goals and recommendations passed by UNCTAD I. The pro-
posal by the developing countries was not accepted by many
nations,"' and the only real progress made was the unanimous adop-
tion of a generalized system of preferences (GSP)."'
UNCTAD III met in 1972 in the wake of a major international
monetary crisis' and resolved to begin work on a charter of
economic rights and duties of states."' The charter was intended
107 G.A. Res. 1785 (XVIII), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 14, U.N. Doe. A/3217 (1962),
In 1963, the Joint Declaration of 75 Developing Countries on UNCTAD was passed to pre-
sent the issues to be discussed at UNCTAD I. The focus was improved and more equitable
trade and economic relations. G.A. Res. 1897 (XVII), 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 24,
U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
1*1 R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 31. It also framed some generally agreed upon principles
for analyzing the situation of developing countries in the world economy.
10 The pledge of Principle Four states that "all countries ... pursue internal and exter-
nal economic policies designed to accelerate economic growth throughout the world ...
in order to narrow the gap between the standard of living in developing countries and
that in developed countries." Id. The United States voted against this statement. Id. at
32 n. 76. The United States abstained on Principle Five, which committed developed coun-
tries to help developing countries. Id. at 32 n. 77 (quoting Final Act, UNCTAD I at 18-19).
110 R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 33. PROTOCOL AMENDING THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE TO INTRODUCE A PART IV ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 17 U.S.T. 1977,
T.I.A.S. No. 6139, 572 U.N.T.S. 320, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 261 (1980).
... The proposal was basically the same as the report Prebisch made to the Conference
that did not recognize any beneficial aspects of the existing international order. R.
MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 33. See Prebisch, Towards a Global Strategy of Development,
report to UNCTAD 2d Sess. TD/3/Rev. 1 (1968).
" Professor Bollecker-Stern points out that the GSP was adopted after "countless resolu-
tions" had been passed in different forums tending toward "a crystallization of new rules."
Bollecker-Stern, supra note 87, at 72.
113 One manifestation of the crisis appeared in President Nixon's 1972 decision to release
the United States dollar from the gold standard and to impose a 10% surcharge on im-
ports. M. KREININ, supra note 26, at 168-92.
." The vote on Resolution 45 calling for the Charter was: 90 for, 0 against, and 19 absten-
tions. R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 38 (quoting Proceedings UNCTAD III, vol. I, 35-36).
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as a code of principles to guide the international economic system
in responding to changed economic and political conditions. The
charter was to be presented to the Twenty-eighth General Session
of the United Nations (1974).115
Negotiations on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States took place throughout 1973 and 1974 during four sessions
of the Working Group," ' the Fourteenth Session of the Trade and
Development Board, "7 and twenty-two meetings of the Second Com-
mittee of the General Assembly. Following this intense two-year
negotiation period, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States was passed by a large majority in the General Assembly. "8
The practice of states over the past thirty years has shown a
willingness to offer economic assistance and trade advantages to
less developed and developing countries. Whatever the reasons
for that practice, most states presently consider themselves
obligated to continue. "9
For those scholars who would require more explicit acceptance
of a practice as evidence of customary law,"2 the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States may provide the means. It
eventually may have the effect of codified customary law as it is
accepted by additional countries through the reconsideration pro-
cess it undergoes every five years. 21
"I Id. at 38. That such a short time was allotted to deal with such complex issues reflects
the increasing impatience and frustration of the developing countries. That obstacles would
have to be overcome was apparent from the "reservations" with no reasons given, ex-
pressed by the United States when abstaining on the resolution. Id.
. The Working Group was composed of UNCTAD members who formed a subcommit-
tee to work on the Charter proposals. As of the first session there were complications
in the negotiations, because the working group allowed non-group UNCTAD members as
well as intergovernmental organizations to participate. This was a major departure from
United Nations procedure and irritated many developed countries. R. MEAGHER, supra
note 26, at 39.
... The Trade and Development Board draws its 55-member board from UNCTAD members
and handles UNCTAD business in the periods between Conferences. It is empowered to
review actions and implement Conference decisions. [1964] U.N.Y.B. 208.
"' The vote was 120-6-10. All negative and abstaining votes were OECD or "developed"
countries. R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 6. However, several OECD countries voted for the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, including Australia, New Zealand, and
Sweden. Id. at 44.
.. Schachter, supra note 98, at 9-13.
1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 96, at 25-27.
"2 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 34. Bulajic points out that this reconsideration
is a step in codification and serves to allow states initially in disagreement to become recon-
ciled to certain emerging principles. It is a step in the process of acceptance required as
evidence of customary law. Dr. Bulajic, Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 45-51 (K. Hossain ed. 1980).
See generally Bollecker-Stern, supra note 87, at 70; Castaneda, supra note 87, at 35-36.
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B. Consensus Agreement
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was ac-
cepted by an overwhelming majority of United Nations Member
States. 2 As unanimity is difficult to achieve in a world of diverse
interests and values, consensus that represents all geographic and
economic systems should be considered a valid means of establish-
ing binding international law.123 In the Texaco Overseas Petroleum
v. Libyan Arab Republic arbitration, the arbitrator did not look
for consensus as to the whole Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, but examined the particular article (article 2) ap-
plicable to the dispute.24 He found article 2 of no use because it
lacked binding effect, not because it was embodied in a United
Nations resolution, but rather because it had not been accepted
by consensus. 2 1 It follows that individual provisions, supported by
a consenus, can be considered binding, independent of the vote
on the resolution as a whole.
Three articles of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States (17, 22, and 25), deal specifically with foreign aid, which
is clearly a crucial element in the implementation of any economic
development project. Article 17 declares in part that international
cooperation for development is the "common duty of all States.
Every state should co-operate with the efforts of developing coun-
tries to accelerate their economic and social development by pro-
viding favorable external conditions and by extending active
assistance to them.., free of any conditions derogating from their
sovereignty.' 2 6
This article clearly imposes a duty upon all states to cooperate
and extend active assistance to developing countries.' Although
article 17 does not specify the type of assistance to be given, arti-
cle 22(3) states that development assistance "should include
economic and technical assistance."'2 s Article 22(1) speaks of
See supra note 118.
123 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 66, at 29. It should be pointed out that the negative votes on the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States were a result of the provisions in article 2 on
compensation for nationalization of resource development.
12 See supra note 66, at 29-31. Professor Dupuy relied upon an earlier United Nations
Resolution, GA. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962),
as reflecting the customary law in the area because it had been "supported by a majority
of Member States representing all the various groups." Supra note 66, at 30.
126 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 17. (emphasis added).
' This article is directed to all states. The proposition made here is that this means
all states, including developing states that have a duty to help less developed states. (em-
phasis added).
.2 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 22, para. 3.
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increased net flows of economic assistance, the volume of which
probably refers to recommendations of UNCTAD and the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, which set target
amounts."9 Article 17 of the Charter was accepted unanimously
by the Second Committee of the General Assembly. 10 Thus the
failure of the United States to cooperate and extend active assist-
ance at Nairobi can be considered a breach of a legal duty derived
from this provision.
Article 22 offers more specific means of providing aid, and article
25 establishes priorities for recipients.' Article 22 calls for "pro-
moting increased net flows of real resources to the developing coun-
tries from all sources ... ."'I' These resources "should include
economic and technical assistance."'" This is a call to action to which
"[a~ll States should respond."' '34
Article 25 states that "the international community, especially
its developed members, shall pay special attention to the particular
needs and problems of the least developed among the developing
countries. .... 135
Although the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
does not mention energy assistance specifically, it is self-evident
that social and economic development are impossible without ade-
quate energy supplies. An obligation to provide development
assistance encompasses, a priori, energy assistance.
There is a critical lack of accessible energy in most developing
countries.136 The problem is so severe as to threaten the ability
to provide food,137 much less provide for economic development.138
The failure of the world community to act decisively at UNERG,
" Id. art. 22(1); R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 79.
13 R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 78. Although the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States was voted upon as an entirety by the General Assembly, the votes in the Second
Committee were provision-by-provision. Most provisions were accepted unanimously in the
Second Committee. Id. at 6 n.36. Virtually all states were represented in the Second Com-
mittee, as evidence by the fact that 121 votes were cast with 10 abstentions. Id. at 44.
'3, G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, arts. 22, 25.
132 Id. art. 22 (emphasis added).
... Id. art. 22, para. 3.
114 Id. art. 33, para. 1 (emphasis added).
131 Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
136 Potential energy is not being used: fuelwood may not be growing near urban areas
where it is needed; hydroelectric power is not being harnessed; solar energy is not being
utilized in sun-drenched areas.
"' Energy is needed to cook foods that cannot be eaten raw and to process agricultural
products for storage.
' See Norman, supra note 3, at 21.
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especially on the deforestation and fuel wood crisis, violates
articles 22 and 25.139
Another provision that deserves consideration in the area of aid
for economic development is article 10 of the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States. This article reflects the concern of
developing countries over their voting power in international finan-
cial organizations, specifically the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. " As the developing countries are depen-
dent upon financial support from developed countries, the weighted
voting arrangements within international financial organizations
are a very delicate matter."' Article 10 nonetheless was adopted
unanimously in the Second Committee. "2 It seeks to have all states
treated as equal members, with full and effective participation in
the solution of world economic, financial and monetary problems
"through the appropriate international organizations in accordance
with their existing and evolving rules."'4
Further, article 10 provides for the use of appropriate interna-
tional organizations to implement such solutions. The failure to
employ a willing World Bank4 in a program for developing new
and renewable energy sources ignores this provision of the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
These four provisions unanimously adopted in the Second Com-
mittee after lengthy negotiations express the collective views of
the international community. They should be considered binding
on the Member States.
C. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as an
Interpretation of the United Nations Charter
The legally binding effect of the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States also may be viewed as an interpretation of
"' Wood is one of the primary sources of energy in the developing countries, where
nearly 950/0 of the rural population uses it for cooking, heating and some processing of
agricultural products. The critical shortage of fuelwood means that even the most basic
energy needs cannot be met. U.N. Division for Economic and Social Information, ENERGY
8 (1981) (mimeographed materials).
140 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 10.
... See R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 71. In 1964, UNCTAD nearly failed to come into ex-
istence because of disagreement over weighted voting, which provides that those who con-
tribute most have the most votes. Id.
,, The article-by-article votes are listed in 29th Plenary Session, U.N.G.A., A/9946 at
24-25 (1974).
13 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 10. (emphasis added).
'" See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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the United Nations Charter. '45 Chapter IX of the United Nations
Charter addresses international economic and social cooperation. '4"
Article 55(b) states that "[w]ith a view to the creation of condi-
tions of stability and well-being ... the United Nations shall pro-
mote ... (b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and
related problems... ."" In article 56, "[ajll members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with
the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
article 55."148
Professor Sohn points out that although articles 55 and 56 "are
general ... they have the force of positive international law and
create basic duties which all Members must fulfill in good faith." 4 9
Precisely because they are so general, any application of these
articles must await further interpretation. The Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States provides an interpretation of what
constitutes "solutions" to international economic problems."
As a charter, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States is necessarily very general and serves mainly as a framework
for future implementation. Insofar as it refines the provisions of
the United Nations Charter, however, it should be considered an
interpretation of that document. The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States can be viewed as giving more specific mean-
ing to "solutions of international economic [and] social . . . prob-
lems."' 5 It calls on states to consider and use certain approaches
in shaping those solutions.'"
The individual provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and
,, See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
"' U.N. CHARTER chap. IX.
147 Id. art. 55, para. b.
Id. art. 56 (emphasis added).
149 Sohn, supra note 82, at 18.
' Id. at 19. Articles 55 and 56 have been interpreted previously. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217-A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948),
was the first step in interpreting article 55(c). Because that declaration was adopted unani-
mously, it was considered an authoritative interpretation of the Charter, and the failure
to observe a provision of the Declaration has been considered a violation of the United
Nations Charter. Sohn, supra note 82, at 19.
"' U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. b.
During the United Nations Conference in 1945 at San Francisco, a committee ex-
pressed the idea that "if an interpretation made by any organ of the Organization . . .
is not generally acceptable it will be without binding force." Sohn, supra note 82, at 14
(quoting Report of Committee IV/2 of the United Nations Conference on International
Organization, San Francisco, June 12, 1945. Doc. 933, IV/2/42(2), 13 United Nations Con-
ference on International Organization Documents 703, 709-10 (1945)). Professor Sohn points
out that the United Nations has accepted a corollary principle that interpretations that
are "generally acceptable (i.e. adopted unanimously or without negative vote)" are binding
on all members. Sohn, supra note 82, at 14. This principle would prohibit viewing the en-
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Duties of States also provide an interpretation of the method of
enactment of these solutions. The call by article 10 for greater
and more equal participation by all members in appropriate inter-
national economic, financial and monetary organizations, is clearly
such an interpretation. 3
Article 17 places a duty upon all states to provide "favourable
external conditions" and to extend "active assistance" to develop-
ing countries to accelerate their economic and social development."M
This same article requires that such assistance be based upon
"development needs and objectives" and be "free of any conditions
derogating from their [developing countries'] sovereignty.' '1 55
Articles 22 and 25 offer more attenuated interpretations. Arti-
cle 22 declares that all states should respond to the problems of
developing countries by promoting increased net flows of real
resources from all sources. An often overlooked but important
aspect of international cooperation is that all states, including the
poorer countries, are to assist less developed countries. This gives
a fresh interpretation to the method of solution of international
problems, as past interpretation seems to have been that only
developed countries had such a responsibility.1"
Insofar as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
elaborates upon United Nations principles, its provisions can be
viewed as interpretations of the United Nations Charter with legal
effect.
D. Implicit Acceptance through Implementation
If the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is viewed
as a framework for evolving norms of international law,'57 the im-
plementation of its provisions gives it greater legal effect. The
implementing acts manifest implicit acceptance of the provisions
upon which they were based.
For example, article 10, which recognizes the equality of states
tire Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as an interpretation, as it was not
accepted unanimously. However, individual provisions, unanimously adopted, arguably may
be considered binding as interpretations.
' G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 10.
Id. art. 17.
155 Id.
" Article 25 refutes this insofar as it singles out the "developed members" of the United
Nations as having a special responsibility to "pay attention to the particular needs and
problems of the least developed . . .countries." Arguably, however, as this provision is
directed toward assisting developing countries that have particular needs (i.e. landlocked
and island countries), it in no way precludes any other countries from contributing just
because they are not purportedly developed countries.
17 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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and their right to full participation in international decision-making
on world economic, financial and monetary matters, has been
defined and implemented further. 58 In 1975, the General Assembly
commissioned a twenty-five member expert committee (consisting
of developing countries, Soviet bloc members and industrialized
countries) to make recommendations on international monetary
reform.'59 This report was adopted unanimously by the expert com-
mittee; it called for a revision of the voting rights in the IMF to
reflect "the legitimate interest of developing countries in a greater
voice in the operation of that institution."'' 0 Since then, both the
IMF and the World Bank have encouraged more members to par-
ticipate in decision-making."'
The major success story of international cooperation of the type
proposed in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
was the adoption of a global food policy by the Second Session
of the World Food Council created by the United Nations General
Assembly.' The Rome Food Conference in 1976163 established the
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) as a new
United Nations specialized agency, financed by member contribu-
tions and committed to making every country self-sufficient for
food production."u
The World Food Council was established at approximately the
same time as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
was adopted, and its accomplishments can be viewed as acceptance
of article 17 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.'65 Article 17 calls for "extending active assistance," which
the Rome Food Conference answered in the form of member con-
tributions to the IFAD.66 It is precisely this kind of coordinated
'5 See supra text accompanying note 110.
's R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 71; A New United Nations Structure for Global
Economic Cooperation, Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United
Nations System. U.N. Doc. E/AC. 62/9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Group of
Experts].
Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 159, at 56.
161 R. MEAGHER, supra note 26, at 72.
162 Id. at 206. See also Ferguson, supra note 28, at 415-16.
'6' This was the second session of the World Food Council created in 1974. G.A. Res.
3348 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) vol. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9886/Add.1 (1974), reprinted
in [1974] U.N.Y.B. 501.
' Ferguson, supra note 28, at 415.
1 The creation of the World Food Council and the adoption of the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States both were envisioned by the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, chap. I, sec. 2, chap. VI. See
supra note 93.
'" G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 17. Professor Ferguson points out the fortuitous
combination of events that made positive United States participation at the Rome Food
Conference politically possible. Ferguson, supra note 28, at 415-16.
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aid program, already undertaken for food, that was sought at
Nairobi for new and renewable energy.
In a further effort to promote international economic coopera-
tion, a new organizational unit was established under the U.N.
Secretary-General to assist in the coordination of work in social
and economic fields. The office of the Director-General for Develop-
ment and International Economic Cooperation (DIEC) was created
specifically to make the United Nations more responsive to the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,'7 by coordinating
all United Nations efforts in its implementation.
Amongst other things, the DIEC has established a program of
multilateral development assistance for the exploration of natural
resources. The United Nations provides the financing through the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to inventory
mineral and energy resources in member countries.'68
Additionally, the International Development Strategy for the
Third United Nations Development Decade, beginning in January,
1981, provides for the creation of a world development fund with
special emphasis upon lending for the development of energy and
mineral resources. 9 This fund was an alternative financing arrange-
ment to a World Bank affiliate on energy.' 0
There have been numerous attempts to implement the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States. There has been signifi-
cant success regarding the establishment of global food policy."'
Substantial progress also has occurred in assessing mineral and
energy potentials in developing countries.' These actions imply
acceptance of the provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, which call for the extension of "active
assistance"'7 3 and the transfer of "real resources to developing
countries."' This implied acceptance through implementation, com-
bined with the explicit acceptance of the unanimously adopted
articles themselves, indicates the legally binding effect of such pro-
visions as principles of international law.
"6 15 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 54-55 (Jan. 1978).
As of June, 1981, forty-four assessment missions had been undertaken. G.A. (36th
Sess. Item 69(f) of the provisional agenda) U.N. Doe. A/36/418 at 2 (1981).
G.A. (36th Sess. Item 69(a) of the provisional agenda) U.N. Doc. A/36/572 at 10 (1981).
170 A World Bank affiliate undoubtedly would be more effective because of the competence
of World Bank financial managers and their considerable expertise in providing loans to
developing countries.
' See supra text accompanying notes f63-165.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 169-172.
' G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 12, art. 17.




The rapidity of change in the international community, especially
since World War II, has encouraged a reappraisal of the sources
of international law, and especially of the legally binding effect
of United Nations resolutions.
The nations of the world community must consider using con-
sensus agreements rather than unanimous acceptance to bind
nations. It must be recognized that state practice undertaken initi-
ally without a sense of obligation can evolve, through widespread,
continued practice, into obligatory international law. More weight
should be given to United Nations resolutions as legally binding
interpretations of the United Nations Charter. Finally, nations must
be willing to recognize a limited legislative role for the General
Assembly. In a world of divergent views, the United Nations with
its universal membership provides an effective forum for develop-
ing .new international legal norms.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United Nations Expert Group on Rural Energy reported
that in 1980 the minimum energy requirements of approximately
ninety million rural dwellers were not being met.'75 An additional
one billion people, both urban and rural, are using their energy
supplies faster than they can be replenished.' 6 Most of the develop-
ing world's populations live in rural areas without electricity. They
depend upon agriculture for their existence, and it is the major activ-
ity for which they need energy."' Simply put, without increased
sources of energy, many of these people will starve.'8
Their energy needs will not be met by fossil fuels. Their inability
to pay the mounting prices for oil already has strained their
economies and slowed their development severely." They need sub-
stantially increased access to energy sources to maintain present
living standards.
With a relatively small initial capital investment, specific pro-
jects can be initiated. As those projects became self-supporting,
aid expenditures would decline. As developing countries became
less dependent upon oil, more oil would be available for the




,,1 See supra note 137.
" See Norman, supra note 3, at 21.
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developed countries' use during the transition to other energy
sources. The decreased demand for oil by the developing countries
could lower world oil prices to the benefit of all. An oil boycott
might be much less effective when supply exceeds demand.
Any projects for developing new and renewable energy sources
will necessitate research and development. The new techniques
that would result, although geared primarily to the needs of
developing countries, would be adaptable to industrialized coun-
try uses and would advance their research and development. These
projects would create new jobs both in the host countries and in
those countries performing the research, production, and manufac-
ture of the necessary technological equipment.
United States foreign policy would be enhanced considerably by
the willingness of the government to carry out its international
legal obligations to assist developing countries. United States
cooperation on this issue would encourage others to cooperate on
other issues.
If the United States were to assist less developed nations in
meeting their energy needs, these nations ultimately would have
greater control over their own energy sources and economic
development. This independence should promote political stability.
Until the change in administrations in 1981, the United States
appeared willing to support the creation of a World Bank affiliate
to coordinate the efficient development of energy sources in the
developing countries. An inter-agency task force coordinated by
the National Security Council, found that United States invest-
ment in the World Bank affiliate would produce "very large benefits
in energy, foreign policy, development, and international trade and
finance. It would be among the most cost effective programs in
the United States energy budget." 8 '
The proposed World Bank affiliate does appear to provide the
best available solution. Member governments would make a rela-
tively small direct contribution. (The United States share for a $30
billion fund would be about $250 million.)"' Member countries also
would provide loan guarantees for additional amounts. (The United
States loan guarantee would be $2.5 billion to $4 billion; as a
guarantee it is unlikely ever to be used.)1 2 The additional money
for the fund would be raised in international money markets on
the basis of the loan guarantees.
Id. at 23 (citing an unpublished report).
' Id. The World Bank estimates that a fund of at least $25 billion is needed just to
reduce developing country oil imports to a manageable level. Id. at 22.
182 Id. at 23.
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OPEC countries would be called upon for contributions and those
with surplus capital would be a source of loan money, thus recycl-
ing petrodollars into energy development.8 3 As with other World
Bank activities, the affiliate would loan to developing countries
for specific projects, and the recipient countries would provide some
of the money themselves.1"
It is clearly in the best interest of the United States to support
a World Bank affiliate for new and renewable energy sources. Its
relatively low cost would benefit many and further the United
States obligations under the United Nations Charter to assist in
the social and economic development of less developed nations
within the world community.
Vicki A. Breman
'8 Id. at 22. World Bank sources have confirmed that the OPEC countries would support
the affiliate on energy. Id.
184 Id.
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